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NOTES.

vide further that the amount disallowed still be used as a measuring
rod to determine the amount allowable within the percentage limitation would correct this defect yet maintain the essential simplicity of
the solution.

STATE WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES AS APPLIED
IN MARITI!M£E ACTIONS

Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the field of maritime law have been optimistically regarded as
".. . several ... that [settle] long debated issues of admiralty law." I

Whether this optimism is justified remains to be answered by future
litigation. They may in fact "settle" issues, but possibly at the expense of opening many new points of debate; there is little doubt,
however, that their impact will be extensively felt. This note will
attempt to indicate their likely effects and will concern itself with
problems arising from the practice in maritime law of "borrowing"
state wrongful death statutes where death occurs on the navigable
waters of a state.
A framework will first be provided within which to consider
this specific problem by summarily tracing the three main concepts
involved: (1) the warranty of seaworthiness; (2) persons to whom
the warranty is owed; and (3) recoveries for death in admiralty.
and Halecki
Following this will be a discussion of the Skovgaard
2
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court.
In this approach there are immediate pitfalls--each of the preliminary topics, for example, is worthy of extensive individual
treatment. Secondly, the topics of warranty of seaworthiness and
individuals to whom it is owed are of course intertwined in their
development, and separate consideration of each is attempted solely
for the sake of clarity. In addition, the lengthy introductory material
is presented with a view toward an understanding of each concept
before engaging in the main discussion-that of their interplay in the
specific death actions which are our primary interest.
Introduction
There was no recovery for wrongful death under the general
maritime law.3 Recovery is now authorized by several federal statI N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1959, p. 62, col. 5.

2 United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613
(1959) ; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
3 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
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utes, and indirectly by wrongful death statutes of the various states.
The latter remedy has grown, by federal decisional law using a concept of "borrowing," to fill the void in the maritime law. In the
federal area, there are the death provisions in the Jones Act 4 and
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. 5 The latter involves
recovery under the workmen's compensation concept rather than a
plenary action. As such, it falls outside of the "recoveries" with
which we are concerned.
For deaths occurring beyond a marine league from shore, Congress, in 1920, provided the Death on the High Seas Act. 6 Within
this marine league, i.e., in the territorial waters of a state, the individual state's death statutes are applicable.
Seaworthiness
The eventful development of the doctrine of unseaworthiness in [the
Supreme] . . . Court is familiar history. Although of dubious ancestry, the
doctrine was born with The Osceola [73 and emerged full-blown forty years
later in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,L8J as an absolute and nondelegable
duty which the owner of a vessel owes to the members of the crew who man
9
her.

Certainly in the field of personal injury this "absolute, nondelegable"
duty to provide a vessel reasonably fit to perform its functions is, as
the Court indicates, of "dubious" ancestry.' 0
Prior to The Osceola," there were cases in which such a duty
was mentioned as being owed to mariners, 12 but these were situations

in which mariners sought to obtain only their wages.

As a defense

to these claims vessel owners would allege nonperformance by the
seaman who could then admit but justify the nonperformance on
the ground that the vessel owner failed to provide safe appliances
with which to accomplish the particular job, or, in effect, failed to
provide a seaworthy vessel. Thus, the mariner's nonperformance,
justified by the vessel's "unseaworthiness," would not prejudice his
wage demands. Our concern, however, is with the warranty of seaworthiness for the breach of which an action for damages will lie.

441 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952).

544 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1952).
641 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §761 (1952).
7 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
8321 U.S. 96 (1944).
9
United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S.
613, 616 (1959).
10 For an exhaustive discussion of seaworthiness see Tetrault, Seamen,
Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNxLL L.Q. 381
(1954).
11 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
12

See, e.g., Dixon v.The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No.3930) (D.Pa. 1789).
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It is this warranty of which Mr. justice Brown speaks in his reference to the owner's obligation of seaworthiness in The Osceola.13
Although Mr. Justice Brown apparently premises the duty on
negligence, 14 the proposition is generally cited as the original definitive American statement on-the vessel owner's absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. 1'
Actually, it took forty years for a case
to hold the duty absolute.' 6 The finding of actual negligence in individual cases appears to have caused the lengthy interim. Certainly,
there was no hesitancy to impose liability without fault upon the
vessel owner. In fact, after The Osceola, cases referred in dictum to
7
the absolute duty of the vessel owner to provide a seaworthy vessel.'

33 189 U.S. 158 (1903). "Upon a full review, however, of English and
American authorities upon these questions, we think the law may be considered as settled upon the folloiVing propositions:
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by
liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to
the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship." Id.

English and American law,
seamen in consequence of
supply and keep in order
at 175.

14 The case cited by Mr. Justice Brown for this proposition is Scarff v.
Metcalf, 107 N.Y. 211 (1887), which involved a failure on the part of the
master of a vessel to allow his injured mate to be hospitalized. This failure

to follow a doctor's directions resulted in an amputation for which the
vessel owner was held liable. The court discussed the obligation of a vessel

owner to provide medical care for the seaman.

It distinguished the case

from one in which the master and mate would be fellow servants.

Here,

said the court, the master was performing the duty of the owners. His
negligence is theirs since "the master stands as the agent and representative of
the owners. . . ." Id. at 216.

In The Osceola the Court, following the existing maritime law, held
that a vessel owner was not liable for the operating negligence of the master.
Neither the cases cited nor the proposition itself appears to indicate an
intent to establish an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.
Other cases cited by Mr. Justice Brown in the decision also premised
liability on negligence. For example, Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 118
Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1854), in which a count for unseaworthiness was
successfully demurred to because of "lack of knowledge or deceit"; Hedley
v. Pinckney & Sons, 7 Asp. M.Y.C. 135, [18941 A.C. 222(E), in which
the court stated: "[T]he obligation [of] . . . the owner and the master,
and every agent charged with the loading of the ship or the preparing
thereof for sea, [is that they] shall use all reasonable means to insure the
seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage..... Id. at 228. (Emphasis added.)
In light of the foregoing, it seems that if Mr. Justice Brown meant to
establish an absolute liability, he would have expressly stated it.
23 See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). "That an
owner is liable to indemnify a seaman for an injury caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel . . . has been settled law . . . since The Osceola..
Id. at 90.
16 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
'7 See,
e.g., Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922);
The H.A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
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The doctrine of seaworthiness was originally adopted from the
maritime law relating to marine insurance I and carriage of goods by
sea. 1 The former required a "seaworthy" vessel as a prerequisite to
underwriting. The latter implied in every contract of affreightment
a warranty that the vessel was adequately outfitted so as to be able
to withstand the perils of ocean voyage encountered in fulfilling the
contractual obligations. These origins led to later problems. Often,
in a personal injury case, a court would define the doctrine of un20
seaworthiness and then cite cargo cases to substantiate its definition.
Although the authorities cited were often inapplicable, the end
sought was effectively achieved, and the doctrine of unseaworthiness,
2
as an absolute and nondelegable duty, is now firmly established. 1
The fact that it imposes liability without fault must be borne in mind
when state death statutes are sought to be utilized to create a right
of recovery. There has been little trouble in the past in applying
these to maritime torts involving negligence. The statutes were
clearly meant to apply to negligent acts and it was but a short step
to their extension to maritime as well as terrene negligence. Where,
as here, a liability without fault unique to the maritime law-seaworthiness-is involved, such extension is less simple.
Persons to Whom the Duty Is Owed
Before 1945, seamen were apparently the only individuals owed
the duty of being provided with a seaworthy vessel. Actually, since
seaworthiness prior to this was presumably premised on negligence,
there was no great incentive for other groups to seek admission to
the favored class. Unlike the seaman, who historically had been denied a cause of action for negligence against his employer,22 others
not similarly handicapped could simply bring an ordinary negligence
18 See, e.g., Hedley v. Pinckney & Sons, 7 Asp. M.Y.C. 135, [1894] A.C.
222(E). "The word 'seaworthy' is a well-known term in shipping law,
and has a perfectly definite and ascertained meaning. It is used to describe
the condition in which a vessel insured under a voyage policy is bound to
be on leaving port if the contract of insurance is to be effectual against the
underwriter." [1894] A.C. at 227.
19 See, e.g., Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, Title Third, Art. XII (1681),
30 Fed. Cas. 1203 (1897). For present statements concerning the applicability
of seaworthiness to cargo, see The Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46
U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1952); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207
(1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1952).
20 See, e.g., Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922),
where Mr. Justice McReynolds cited two cargo cases, The Silvia, 171 U.S.
462 (1898), and The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903), in support of a definition
of seaworthiness in a personal injury action.
21 See United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S.

613 (1959). ". . .[T]he doctrine . . . emerged . . . as an absolute and nondelegable duty.... ." Id. at 616.
22 See GILMORE & BLACK. ADMIRALTY 248-50, 279-80 (1957).
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action without additionally alleging an unseaworthy condition. The
seaman, of course, had to successfully allege such a condition to
recover. However, with the advent of seaworthiness as imposing
liability without fault, the impetus was provided for mariners outside
the seaman category to press for inclusion within the benefited
class.
In 1920 the Jones Act 2 3 was passed by Congress to provide
a seaman with a cause of action in negligence against his employer,
usually the vessel owner. Thereafter, with respect to personal injury actions, the positions of seamen, longshoremen and harborworkers began to converge.
The seaman now had a cause of action for negligence to accompany his existing action for unseaworthiness. Then, in a series of
Supreme Court cases,24 longshoremen and many harborworkers were
brought within that group of persons to whom the duty to provide
a seaworthy vessel was owed. The explanation for the extension
was that these workers were doing the work formerly performed by
seamen. Modern technical advancement, complexity of vessel operation and the resultant specialization of labor should not work to
limit the scope of the vessel owner's prior duty to all individuals in
the ship's service. As a result, seamen, longshoremen and certain
categories of harborworkers may now proceed against the vessel
owner on either or both theories-negligence and unseaworthiness.
The different periods of limitation may also play an important
part in electing a remedy. Where the negligence action may be extinguished due to passage of the statutory period of limitation, the
count for unseaworthiness may remain extant, due to laches as applied in admiralty. However, if passage of time precludes the negligence action, failure to fall within the group owed the duty of a
seaworthy vessel would still preclude any recovery.
The key difficulty in this area is the determination of just which
done by seamen," so as to
workers are "doing work traditionally
25
belong to the favored group.

2341 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952).

24 The idea of individuals other than seamen themselves being entitled
to the same treatment as actual seamen began in International Stevedoring Co.
v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926), in which Mr. Justice Holmes indicated
that loading and discharging cargo was a function "formerly rendered by
the ship's crew." Id. at 52. Although the statement was made in order
to enable longshoremen to come within the Jones Act provisions, it was
later utilized in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), to extend
unseaworthiness to longshoremen, and in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S.
406 (1953), to certain categories of longshoremen.
25 See United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S.
613 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
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Recoveries for Wrongful Death in Admiralty
As previously mentioned, there was no recovery for death in the
general maritime law. 6 State statutes were, however, early27utilized
This
by admiralty courts to permit recovery for wrongful death.
policy was in conformity with the admiralty practice allowing state
law to supplement the maritime law where it is neither in conflict
with, nor will have an adverse effect upon, the desired uniformity of
the maritime law.
Originally, the question of which "death act" would apply when
death occurred outside the territorial waters of a state was answered
by applying the death act of the state where the vessel was registered.2 8
Subsequent federal legislation curtailed the applicability of the state
statutes. In 1920 the Jones Act 29 and the Death on the High Seas
Act 30 were passed. In the Jones Act, the seaman was not only provided with a cause of action for negligence, but his representatives
were given a right to recover for his negligently caused wrongful
death, all of which was pursuant to the Federal Employers'
32 Liability
Act 31 which the Jones Act made applicable to seamen.
It should be noted that the death provision in the Jones Act
is limited to "negligently caused deaths," which excludes recovery
under it for unseaworthiness. 33 This legislation precluded the appliaffected by the act, limiting their
cation of state statutes to individuals
34
recovery to the federal statute.
The Death on the High Seas Act 3' affected an area rather than
individuals. It became the basis of recovery for any death occurring
beyond a marine league from any state-also, in effect, excluding the
subsequent application of state death acts to the high seas. If the
Death on the High Seas Act were made applicable to all navigable
waters it would result in the elimination of the application of state
death acts in admiralty. The legislative intent was, however, to leave
state's death statute effective within its own territorial
the individual
36
waters.
26 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
27

See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907)

(Delaware wrongful death

statute applied to injury causing death occurring at sea).
28 Ibid.

Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952).
Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §761 (1952).
3135 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1952).
32 See GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY § 6-29 (1957).
2941
3041

33 Kunschman v. United States, 54 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1932).
Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952).
36 See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). "The legislative
history of the Death on the High Seas Act discloses a clear congressional
purpose to leave 'unimpaired the rights, under State Statutes as to deaths
on waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the States.' S. Rep. No. 216, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3; H.R. Rep. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 3." Id. at 593.
34
35
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The third statute effecting recoveries for death in the maritime
law is the death provision in the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers'
Act.37
The Jones Act and the Longshoremen's Act provide the exclusive recovery for death between, respectively, a seaman's representatives and his employer, and longshoremen's and harborworkers' representatives and their employeis; these acts remain exclusive, regardless of whether the tort on which the complaint is based occurred
within or beyond a marine league from shore.
Although the above statutes appear to have greatly reduced the
area in which state statutes have effect, this is not actually the case.
First of all, many, if not most, "wrongful" deaths occur within
the territorial waters of a state-the most accident-prone period
of a voyage is understandably during loading and discharging.
Secondly, although the representatives of longshoremen and harborworkers are precluded from any recovery beyond that granted under
the Longshoremen's Act, this limitation is applicable only to actions
against the employer. Ordinarily this employer is an independent
contracting stevedore or repair firm. Therefore, the representative
may elect to proceed under the state act against the vessel owner for
his allegedly tortious conduct. It can readily be seen that the area
in which state statutes determine the rights of decedent's representatives remains extremely broad.
38
The Tungus v. Skovgaard

The Skovgaard case was a libel in personam by a widow
and administratrLx for wrongful death, in which she alleged failure
to provide the decedent with a safe place in which to work. He had
been called aboard the vessel by his employer, an independent contractor hired to accomplish the discharge of the vessel's cargo of
cocoanut oil. The pump used in discharging the oil had become defective, and the decedent was summoned to assist in its repair. His
death occurred when he fell into eight feet of hot oil while attempting
to accomplish the necessary repairs. The libelant based her claim
on the New Jersey wrongful death statute.39 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed 40 the district court's dismissal of the
libel. The lower court had held that an action for wrongful death
based upon unseaworthiness would not lie: that petitioner did not
owe the decedent the duty to use reasonable care to provide a safe
place in which to work. The Supreme Court, on certiorari, affirmed
the court of appeals' interpretation of the New Jersey death statute
as including a recovery based upon unseaworthiness. It left to the
3744

Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1952).

38 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (1952).
40 Skovgaard v. The M/V Tungus, 252 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957).
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district court the determination of what defenses, if any, are available under New Jersey law. The Supreme Court also held that since
the officers of the Tungus remained in control of the vessel, the shipowners owed the decedent the duty to provide a safe place in which
to work.
The importance of the case is the way in which the Court adopts
a state-created right and applies it to a cause of action based on a
maritime tort. The decedent was one of those individuals to whom
was owed the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. 41 That duty was
breached, resulting in his death. Since the maritime law provides
no recovery for wrongful death, the state act was utilized to provide
a right of action. Once the state act was incorporated, it was determinative of its own extent and limitations.
The Court declared that absent express declarations within the
statute concerning applicability and limitations, state court interpretations of the act are binding. Where there is neither express statutory intent nor state court construction, the district court may construe the statute and, if not "clearly erroneous," those determinations will be upheld.
Mr. Justice Brennan concurred with the result but dissented
from the majQrity's use of state law. He declared that the Court
was ignoring a basic distinction between rights and remedies, that
the death acts should provide merely the remedy, that the maritime
law prescribes the rights and duties involved and the state statute
is merely a "remedial incident ...

rationally utilized through analogy

by courts charged with the enforcement of federal rights and duties
and the construction of a proper pattern of remedies to that end." 42
He decried the effects on the maritime law of the Court's holding.
The holding will involve the interpretation of each state's statute to
determine the intent of its legislature with regard to application of
the statute to maritime torts. His fear is of the effect that interpretation of forty-nine state death acts will have on the uniformity of
the maritime law.
43
United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki

The Halecki case was tried on the law side of the federal court
under the "saving to suitors" clause. 44 Federal jurisdiction was based
upon diversity of citizenship. As in the prior case, the action was
41 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 595 n.9 (1959).
42 Id. at 604 (concurring opinion).
43358 U.S. 613 (1959).
4428 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
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based upon the New Jersey wrongful death act 4' for negligence and
unseaworthiness. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for the administratigx, holding that the New
Jersey statute incorporates liability for unseaworthiness and adopts the
federal rule of comparative negligence for torts committed upon the
navigable waters of a state. The Supreme Court reversed. It found
that Halecki failed to come within the group to whom is owed the
duty of providing a seaworthy vessel. Decedent, engaged in cleaning
generators with carbon tetrachloride, was held not to beo doing work
traditionally done by seamen.
The lower court had submitted the case to the jury on both
negligence and unseaworthiness. The Supreme Court held that petitioner owed decedent the duty to use reasonable care to provide him
with a safe place in which to work. As a result, the case was returned by the Court to determine the question of recovery based solely
on a negligent failure to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the
decedent.
The Court, in conformity with its opinion in Skovgaard, viewed
with approval the court of appeals' approach to the case as one involving an interpretation of state law.
Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, followed the disapproval he had
voiced in Skovgadrd of the error in the state law approach. In addition, he viewed the Court's determination that Halecki was not
possessed of the right to a seaworthy vessel as equally erroneous.
He considered Halecki's job as clearly within the scope of the
Sieracki and Hawn decisions, 46 there being a clear analogy between
Halecki's work and the work historically done by seamen. 47 In his
approach he views the Sieracki doctrine as embracing all those in the
ship's service. He does not attempt to determine whether a particular function was ever actually performed in the past by seamen,
and considers such an approach an "inversion" of the Sieracki principle, which will lead to uncertainty in the law.
In a concurring opinion to both cases, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
states his reasons for refraining from his usual assertion in cases involving state law to the effect that the cases should be held in the
federal courts while an authoritative construction of state law is
sought.
The holdings in Skovgaard and Halecki do not actually indicate
a solution to problems involved in state supplementation of the general maritime law. Rather, they affirm the approach to be used by
the lower courts in enforcing state-created rights in the maritime
45N.J.

STAT.

ANN. §2A:31-1 (1952)

(the same statute involved in

Skovgaard).
41 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
47

See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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law. State rather than federal law is to determine the application
of the right.
The cases illustrate tha unique conflicts problems confronting the
courts in maritime cases. The initial jurisdiction of admiralty is
determined by the nature of the claim. If it is maritime, a federal
court sitting in admiralty is competent to hear the case. A contract
must be essentially maritime and a tort must have occurred on navigable waters to fulfill the court's jurisdictional requirement. Once
the requirement is met, the court sitting without a jury hears the
case and applies the general maritime law as supplemented by federal legislation. Such was the intent of the framers of the Constitution, who left to the district courts original jurisdiction of ".

.

. any

civil case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." 48 In addition,
under the "saving to suitors" clause, common-law courts may exercise jurisdiction over maritime matters. It is, however, settled that
this clause simply saves to litigants remedies available at common
law, preserving the applicability of the substantive maritime law to
maritime actions tried in state courts.49 If the proper jurisdictional
requirements .are met, actions under the "saving to suitors" clause
may also be brought on the law side of the federal court. In any
event, the" maritime rights are still determined by the substantive
maritime law.
As previously mentioned, it has become the practice to supplement the maritime law through the use of state decisional and statutory law. This utilization may be accomplished in two ways: by
analogy of common-law principles, and by enforcement of rights arising out of state statutes. For example, the adoption of a state statute
to preclude abatement of a cause of action has been applied as an
incident, regardless of its importance to the titigants involved, to preserve the enforceability of a maritime right.50 Application of a state
statute may, however, create a right the extent of which is to be determined according to the creating state's legislative intent. Mr.
justice Stewart, in Skovgaard and Halecki, therefore looked to state
law to determine the construction placed upon these statutes and the
applicable defenses under them. The initial determination is whether
the breach of duty proximately causing death is one recognized by
state law and to which its statute is applicable. If it is, then the state
statute will be examined to determine whether a right to recover for
the death exists. In Skovgaard the court of appeals found that New
48

Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952).

49 Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 383 (1918), quoting with

favor The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866): "That clause
only saves to suitors 'the right of a common-law remedy, where the common
law is competent to give it.' It is not a remedy in the common-law courts
which
is saved, but a common-law remedy. .. ."
50
Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941). The Court in this case does
not make the same distinction as made here. It is contended, however, that
the distinction between preservation and creation of a right is valid.
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Jersey adopted the federally defined duty to provide a seaworthy
vessel. It also found that according to New Jersey law, petitioner
owed decedent the duty to exercise due care in order to provide him
with a safe working area. Halecki was similarly treated, although
decedent failed to fall within that "favored group" to which was owed
the absolute duty of a seaworthy vessel. Interestingly, the Court in
Halecki approved the lower court's holding concerning the adoption
by New Jersey law of the admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence. This "adoption" involves travelling a rather circuitous route
in finding an applicable standard.
It is the maritime law that initially incorporates the state statute
within the admiralty framework to fill a void. Then the state statute
and state decisional law construing and applying the statute are examined to determine the extent to which the statute is applicable to
a maritime tort. When the Supreme Court in Halecki approved
a determination that New Jersey law incorporated the admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence, it consented to a "dual" applicability
of the statute. In New Jersey contributory negligence is a complete
defense where land torts are involved. By assenting to a different
rule for maritime torts, the Court consents to the theory that a state
statute may be subject to a different matrix of rights, duties and liabilities for torts occurring on navigable waters. 51 The circle is complete when the question of where these separate standards are going
to be obtained is answered. Where but to the maritime law would
state courts look if the above approach is used?
The problem becomes more acute when it is realized that state
courts are under no compulsion to follow the approach apparently
approved by the Supreme Court. A holding by the highest court of
a state that its statute is to be applied uniformly, regardless of the
place where the tort occurs, is thereafter binding and precludes the
"dual" applicability theory.
Due to the unique jurisdictional makeup of American maritime
law, as well as the overriding desirability of uniformity in this area,
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins5 2 has been given little effect. Article III of
the Constitution extends the jurisdiction of the federal courts to "all

5" See United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 251
F.2d 708, 716-17 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
52304 U.S. 64 (1938), construing the "Rules of Decisions Act," 28 U.S.C.
§ 725 (1940), which read at that time: "That the laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution, treaties

or statutes of the

United States

shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law.in the courts of the United States in cases where
they apply."
It is presently worded: "The laws of the several states,

except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision

in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply."

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1952).
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cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." 53 The federal courts
in exercising this jurisdiction over maritime matters have interpreted
and applied the so-called general maritime law, that body of law
growing out of the historical customs, usages and occasional statutes
promulgated by seafaring nations. This federal court interpretation
supplemented by federal statutes became the maritime law of this
country. When the navigable waters to which this law applies are
part of the territorial waters of a state, a conflicts problem arises.
While a state has technical jurisdiction within a marine league from
shore, 54 the supremacy of the maritime law was early indicated.
State courts exercising jurisdiction over maritime litigation have on
occasion applied their own interpretation of the maritime law.55 This
erroneous practice has not been followed, 56 since it is incorrect to
allow the utilization of the "saving to suitors" clause to affect the
substantive law applicable to a maritime action. The clause saved
a common-law remedy, based upon the federally defined maritime law. The disruptive effect a contrary practice would have upon
the maritime law is obvious. The proper disposition of maritime
actions in state courts is, then, analogous to a federal court's enforcement of state law under Erie. To insure uniformity, the state court
determines the rights of parties to a maritime action in accordance
with the maritime law as defined in the federal courts.
The Erie decision insured federal application of the laws of the
various states, and overruled Justice Story's indication of the existence of a uniform general commercial law. Uniformity of law on
navigable waters is considered of greater importance than the uniform application of the various states' laws to their natural limits
when those limits include navigable waters. This conflicting desire
for uniformity in both state and maritime law has therefore been resolved in favor of the maritime law, while the general commercial
law of Mr. Justice Story was considered an unacceptable encroachment upon the desired uniform application of state law. Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins 5 7 would not appear to have been meant to apply in
admiralty.
State Death Acts
By reason of the holdings in Skovgaard and Halecki, an important question to litigants is the nature of the various state death
53 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
54 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959)

(dissenting opinion).
"The State territorial waters, while within the cognizance of federal- maritime
law, are also subject to the jurisdiction of the States." Id. at 595 n.9, citing
Toomey v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
55 See, e.g., Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
56 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1942).
57304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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acts. Although all have enacted statutes creating a right to recover
for a death, a comparison indicates their many differences. The majority are patterned after the' familiar "Lord Campbell's Act," "
which was the initial statutory relief to fill this unfortunate shortcoming of the common law. The New Jersey act,39 held in Skovgaard
to include a right of recovery for unseaworthiness, contains similar
wording and is representative of the majority of state death acts.
There has been little hesitancy in the past to allow a state-created
right of recovery to lie. 0° It would therefore seem that, absent a
contrary expression by state court or legislature, statutes with similar wording apply to deaths caused by a breach of the duty of seaworthiness. The reasons for application in individual cases may
differ. It could, for example, result from an analysis of the statute
concluding that each term is descriptive of a category of acts for which
a recovery will lie. Thus, "neglect" could include all negligent acts,
leaving one of the others, e.g., "wrongful act" or "default," to embrace a breach of duty regardless of fault. 61
It would be difficult to apply to the breach of the warranty of
seaworthiness a statute which expressly premises recovery on negli63
gence 62 or, as in Massachusetts, culpability of the wrongdoer.
However, regardless of the seeming lack of logic, such a result may
be reached in at least some cases. For justification, it could be stated
that absolute duties were unknown at the time the statute was passed.
Therefore, although specifying negligence, it was in fact intended to
encompass all "wrongfully" caused deaths, including unseaworthiness.
It could also be argued that public policy and the remedial aspect
of the wrongful death acts are grounds for application. It thus appears that every statute is possibly applicable to unseaworthiness.
58 Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93: "Whensoever the death
of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the
act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in

respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have
been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death
shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to
felony."
50N.J. STAT. AN-,. §2A:31-1 (1952).
60 See Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 YALE L.J. 395 (1926).
61 See Skovgaard v. The M/V Tungus, 252 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1957).
62 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1301 (1956).
The statute applies to
"all cases where the death of a human being results from a crime or from
criminal or other negligence." Ibid.
3MAss. ANN. LAws c. 229, § 6E (1955).
Damages are "assessed with
reference to the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer." See O'Leary v.
United States Lines Co., 215 F.2d 703 (1st Cir. 1954). In this case the widow
of a longshoreman was denied recovery under the Massachusetts act due to
her failure to prove negligence. See generally, Comment, State Wrongful
Death Statutes in Admiralty, 7 STAN. L. Rm 261 (1955).
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The above hypothetical approaches are possibilities only where
there has been no authoritative holding to the contrary. Once a state
court passes upon the question of 'death statute application in admiralty, it is definitive.
The essential elements of wrongful death statutes may be roughly
divided into six categories: (1) acts to which the statute is applicable; (2) lien provision, if any; (3) statute of limitations; (4) measure of damages; (5) limitation, if any, on amount recoverable; and
(6) distribution of recovery.
As already discussed, category 1 differs in "Lord Campbell's"
acts 64 and acts apparently premised on negligence. 65 The latter appear by their express terminology to allow recovery only where negligence can be shown. The former, due to their wording, appear more
easily applicable to actions based upon a liability without fault. Where
"wrongful act, neglect or default" once seemed merely redundant,
each is now being held to describe a separate act for which the statute
will lie.
There are several which fall into neither of the above subcategories. They are apparently not limited to negligence, 6 which
64

ARiz. REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 12-611

(1956); ARKx.

STAT.

§ 27-906 (Supp.

§ 41-1-2 (1953); D.C. CODE' ANN. § 16-1201 (1951);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 246-6 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 70, § 1 (SmithHurd 1956); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 165, § 9 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 67,
1957); CoLo.

REV. STAT.

§ 1 (1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.711 (Supp. 1957); Miss. CODE
§ 1453 (Supp. 1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon Supp. 1958);
REv. STAT. § 30-809 (1956); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.080 (1957); N.J.

ANN.
NEB.

STAT.

ANN. § 2A:31-1 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-1 (1953); N.Y. DEcED.
EsT. LAW § 130; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1957); N.D. REv. CODE
§32-2101 (1943); OnIo REV. CODE ANN. §2125.01 (Baldwin 1958); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (Supp. 1958) ; R.I. GEN: LAWS c. 10, § 7-1 (1956) ;
S.C. CODE § 10-1951 (1952); S.D. CODE §37.2201 (Supp. 1952); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. §8-633 (Supp. 1958); WASH.
REv. CODE § 4.20.010 (1958) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5474 (1955) ; Wis. STAT.
.§331.03 (1957); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §3-403 (Supp. 1957).
65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §3704(b) (1953)
(". . . caused by unlawful
violence or negligence . . . .") ; GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1301 (1956) ("... shall
include all cases where the death of a human being results from a crime or
from criminal or other negligence."); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 229, § 2 (Supp.
1958) ("A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person in
the exercise of due care .... "); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (Purdon
1953) (". . . shall be occasioned 'by unlawful violence or negligence ......).
66 They merely use slightly different terminology than that found in the
"Lord Campbell's Acts." ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 123 (1940); ALASKA
COmP. LAWS ANN. § 61-7-3 (Supp. 1958); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377
(Deering 1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555 (1958) (not a separate wrongful
death statute but a survivor's action to which is added the additional element
of death); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (1941); IDAHO CODE ANN. .§ 5-311
(1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404 (Supp. 1957); IOWA CODE ANN. § 635.9
(1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3203 (Supp. 1957) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§411.130 (Baldwin 1955); LA. Cir. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1952); MIN..
STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (Supp. 1958) ; MON.T. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2810 (1947);
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is the important element when questioning their application to
unseaworthiness.
Several states 67 provide for maritime liens (category 2) in their
acts, 68 thereby entitling the party to proceed in rem against the vessel
in an admiralty court.
The statutes of limitation (category 3) are ordinarily one,69
two 70 or three 71 years. Once again, however, there are several
exceptions. Alabama, for example, in its separate death statute, applicable where the decedent was a minor child, allows parents six
months in which to bring an action after, which
the cause of action
72
passes to the child's personal representative.
The damages recoverable (category 4) are, for the most part,
the pecuniary loss suffered through the loss of decedent on whom the
beneficiary relied, at least in some measure, for support. 73 The considerations include age.at death, life expectancy, estimated earning
capacity and, in some instances, express allowance for loss of dece74
dent's educational, cultural and moral assistance to his children.
75
Some also allow recovery for loss of love and affection.
Funeral
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §556:12 (1955); ORE. REv. STAT. §30-020 (1957);
TENN. CODE ANN. §20-607 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. SfAT. ANN. art. 4671
(1952); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-11-7 (1953).
0 States will hereafter be referred to by name only, when reference to
notes 64, 65 or 66 will disclose the statute's location in the particular state
code.' Citations will be given only where the citation is to a section of a state
statute apart from the general heading under which the wrongful death statute

is found.

69Florida; Maryland; MINN. STAT. ANN. §579.01 (Supp. 1958); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 1565 (1942) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 783.010 (Supp. 1957) ; VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-633 (Supp. 1958).
69 CAL. CODE CIV. PRAc. § 340 (Deering 1958) ; Connecticut (one year after
injury sustained or discovered except a limit of 3 years after act); District
of Columbia; Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. §413.140 (Baldwin 1954); Louisiana;
Massachusetts (except that no recovery where death occurred 2 years after
injury); Minnesota (in a libel against the vessel, but 3 years for an in personam
action); Miss. CODE ANN. § 728 (1942); Missouri; North Carolina; Pennsylvania; TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (1955).
70 Alabama; ALASKA ComP. LAws ANN. § 55-2-7 (1949); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (1941); GA. CODE
ANN. § 3-1004 (1936) ; Hawaii; IDAHO R. Civ. P. § 15; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas;
Nebraska; New Hampshire; New York; N.D. REv. CODE § 28-0-118 (1943);
Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Rhode Island; TEx. RFv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526
(1958);
Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Wis. STAT. §330.21 (1957); Wyoming.
71
Arkansas; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.605 (Supp. 1957); MONT. REv. CODE
ANN. § 93-2605 (1947); New Mexico; South Dakota.
72 See also Maryland (6 months) and S.C. CODE § 10-143 (1952) (6 years).
73 Practically all jurisdictions use this measure. Exceptions are Georgia
(full present value) ; Nevada (pecuniary and exemplary) ; New Mexico (compensatory and exemplary) ; North Dakota (as jury finds proportionate to the
injuries) ; Virginia (such damages as to the jury seem fair and just) ; West
Virginia (fair and just as found by the jury).
74 See, e.g., Kansas.
7 See, e.g., Hawaii.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
expenses are usually includible.
damages ".

. . with
.... ,,76

[ VOL. 33

The Massachusetts act determines

reference to the degree of culpability of [the

wrongdoer]
Most states do not have limitations on the amount recoverable
(category 5). Those that do, have in recent years increased the
77
amounts, reflecting the existing economy.
Some also have manda78
tory minimum sums recoverable.
The distribution of the amounts recovered (category 6) is accomplished in one of several ways. Some statutes expressly provide
a scheme of distribution or allow judge or jury to apportion the
amount recovered. They ordinarily provide for the dependent next
of kin, with preference for the spouse and children. Recovery is in
most cases apportioned according to the degree of dependency of
the individuals involved. Other states utilize the ordinary statutes
79
of descent and distribution, treating the recovery as personalty.
The amount is usually not subject to the debts of the decedent.

Conclusion
It can be seen that these differences between jurisdictions are
more than incideital. Legislation extending the Death on the High
Seas Act would provide one solution. By eliminating the necessity
of divining the intent of state legislatures, uniformity would be restored to the maritime law in the area. The right of recovery would
become a creation of the maritime law subject to a single uniform
application to deaths occurring on all navigable waters.
The adoption of state statutes to fill a void in the maritime law
could never have been meant to be at the expense of the desired
uniformity of that law.
The present situation creates confusion in both the federal
and state courts. The federal courts must determine state law
Am-. LAWS c. 229, § 6E (1955).
($50,000); Colorado ($25,000); Illinois ($10,000) ; Indiana
(formerly had a $15,000 limitation which was removed) ; Kansas ($25,000) ;
Massachusetts ($20,000) ; Minnesota ($25,000) ; Missouri ($25,000) ; New
Hampshire ($10,000, which is increased to $25,000 if there is a surviving
spouse, child, children, or dependent grandparents); Oregon ($20,000); South
Dakota ($20,000) ; Virginia ;($30,000, formerly $25,000); West Virginia
($10,000 unless more pecuniary loss is shown, and then $25,000) ; Wisconsin
($15,000 for pecuniary loss; additional $25,000 to spouse or parents for loss
of society and companionship).
78 Massachusetts ($2,000); Rhode Island ($2,500).
79 These states have within their wrongful death statutes the distribution
scheme to be used for any recoveries: Alabama; Colorado; CoNN. GENZ." STAT.
§ 45-280 (1958); Georgia; Indiana; Iowa; Louisiana; New Jersey; North
Carolina; Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; Vermont; West Virginia; Wyoming.
Many states provide that the recovery shall descend according to their regular
laws of descent where there are no named statutory beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island.
76MAss.

77 Alaska
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with no state precedent to guide them. The state courts must make
a similar determination and also seek a standard by which the state
right should be applied in a maritime action, also under the handicap
of no precedent-in their case federal-to guide them. In either
case, the judge must determine whether the state act is meant to
apply to unseaworthiness, whether it should be applied in conformity
to or differently from the way in which it is applied on land and, if
differently, to what extent. Litigants are left to conjecture on what
the answers to the above will be.
By expressly reserving the manner of distribution of any recovery to the state in whose waters the wrong occurred, the state's
interest would be preserved. By resolving the uncertainty, the statutory assistance would tend to avoid the endless litigation which under
existing circumstances seems inevitable.

